Austin, Texas Chapter

The Association for all Military Officers
Companion Bulletin - November 2004

Commander's Comments Companions, we owe many thanks to Colonel Neil S. Fox II, US Marine Corps (Ret) for his outstanding presentation on the operation of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command at our October meeting. Then continuing our outstanding guest speaker program, we are fortunate to have Captain Eric Sims as our speaker in November. Captain Sims just returned from duty in Iraq and looks forward to telling you what really is going on there from his perspective. November the 11th is Veteran's Day and our next meeting. The United Heritage Federal Credit Union has donated $1,000.00 to the Austin Military Service Coalition for the Veteran's Day Parade and we are seeking a suitable vehicle in which to ride. We really miss Vernal and Betty Bracken and their double sliding door van. What a parade vehicle! Our December meeting will be at the Austin Club on our regular second Thursday of the month schedule, so remember to block your calendar. Each of us periodically meets interesting people who have information and/or experiences that many in the Chapter would very much like to hear about. Call or E-mail me with your suggestions at 512-261-6272 or redleg6@juno.com. I will be responsible for the necessary coordination. To one and all.... make sure that you vote                                             COL Andrew McVeigh

Meeting, 11 November 2004 Holiday Inn Northwest (Mopac & Hwy 183)  The cost for the evening is $18.00. If you are not called by 7 Nov., contact COL Szendrey (388-1005). Schedule: 1830-1900-Social 1900-1905-Invocation & Salutes 1905-1945-Dinner 1945-2000-Break 2000-2015 Awards & Festivities 2015-2045 Speaker 2045-2100-Adjourn Menu Sliced Roast Beef w/Hunter Sauce, Garlic Mashed Potatoes, Fresh Vegetables, Dessert & Coffee Speaker Captain Eric Sims Chaplain's Selection "Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." - Matthew 11:28 Directory The distribution of the chapter directory is tentatively scheduled to be done at the November meeting

Chapter Officers Commander - COL McVeigh Senior Vice Cmdr. - COL Hefford Junior Vice Cmdr. - CAPT Burrill Adjutant - COL Szendrey Treasurer - LTC Kelso Chaplain - CDR Cochran Surgeon - MG Bernstein Judge Advocate - COL Philips Public Information - Ervalyn McVeigh Membership - Vacant Mark Your Calendar  The Austin Club - 9 December meeting and keep in mind that we need 30 attendees to have the reduced price ($25.00 per person)  ROTC Awards Please make a contribution at the November meeting for the purchase of ROTC medals - need about 23 medals ($10.00 per).  Legislation * H.R. 4175, the Veterans Compensation Cost-of- Living Adjustment Act of 2004- The final word: The Bureau of Labor Statistics released September's

inflation data, which finalizes the 2004 cost of living adjustment (COLA) for military retired pay and other federal annuities. The 2004 COLA will be 2.7 percent for military and federal retired pay, VA disability compensation, SBP survivor annuities. Social Security, and other federal programs. The COLA for these programs will be effective December 1st, and will be reflected in checks issued on January 2, 2005.  Item of Interest Fearing a sharp decline in recruiting and troop retention, the Army is considering cutting the length of its 12-month combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Senior Army personnel officers, as well as top Army Reserve and National Guard officials, say the Army's ability to recruit and retain soldiers will steadily erode unless combat tours are shortened, to some length between 6 and 9 months. Army officials responsible for combat operations and war planning have significant concerns that the Army cannot meet projected requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan unless active duty and reserve troops spend 12 months. Officials say it is too early to predict if or when a new deployment policy might take effect or how it would be carried out. But the proposal to shorten combat tours collides with the immediate need to maintain current troop strength in Iraq and Afghanistan. Army planners say they must at least prepare to keep troops at the current levels in Iraq - 138,000 - through 2007, even though no political decision has been made in that regard.

 

Saudi Arabia's Links to Terrorism  Once, there were solid grounds for a partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia. After World War II, the kingdom's vast oil reserves and willingness to use its production capacity to ensure moderate and stable world oil prices were rightly judged to be vital to American national security. In return for these strategic assets, the United States pledged to protect the kingdom's oil supplies and obstruct those who would seek to control them. In 1945, a marriage of convenience was born. But the original reasons for this marriage of convenience have long since faded away. The first indications that the foundations of this partnership were eroding came in the early 1970s, when the Saudis took the lead in establishing the OPEC oil cartel. Saudi Arabia was among the three leading instigators of the 1973 embargo on oil shipments to the United States. The rationale for this partnership completely unraveled following the 1979 establishment of an Islamic Republic in Tehran, when Iranian clerics challenged the religious credentials of the Saudi monarchy. Ayatollah Khomeini condemned Saudi royals as corrupt, venal and decidedly un Islamic. That they should be challenged at all was bad enough - that they should be challenged by Shiites, regarded, as a heretical sect by most Sunni Muslims, was intolerable. Since it established control over the Arabia peninsula in the 1920s, the Saudi royal family has claimed to be the guardian of Islam's two holiest sites - Mecca and

Medina - and prides itself on upholding the "purest" form of Islam, known as Wahhabism. Until the late 1970s, Wahhabism was an extreme sect that happened to rule Saudi Arabia, but did not bother too many outside the kingdom's borders. To counter the proliferation of anti-Saudi Iranian propaganda, however, the Saudis decided to spread Wahhabi teachings abroad. The royal family's oil wealth poured into countries throughout the Islamic world, from West Africa to Indonesia, fueling a proliferation of madrasas (religious schools) that indoctrinated a new generation Islamists. Even in the United States, Muslim children studied Islamic primers shipped from Wahhabi institutes in Saudi Arabia. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 provided the kingdom with an ideal opportunity to sponsor a bona fide holy war that would showcase Wahhabi ideals and quiet Iranian-inspired Islamist opposition to the monarchy. Madrasas around the Arab and Islamic world produced shock troops for this jihad. After the Russians were driven out of Afghanistan, these "Arab Afghans" began trickling home and looked for other jihads. The Saudis had created a monster; to be sure they did not wreak havoc inside the kingdom, bin Laden and other Saudi Islamists were encouraged to wage holy war abroad.

When the Clinton administration cornered Osama bin Laden in the Sudan in 1998, the Saudis refused to allow his extradition back home, where he could be neutralized. Instead, they reportedly offered bin Laden $200 million to go to Afghanistan, on the condition that he not target the Saudi royal family. Bin Laden honored his promise. Inside the kingdom, Al-Qaeda has only operated against the Americans and the British. Over time, the understanding became that bin Laden would leave the Saudis alone only if they allowed the network of charities funding Al- Qaeda to operate unhindered. On the day after the September 11 attacks, the first thing Riyadh did was evacuate two dozen members of the bin Laden family residing in the US. With the end of the Cold War, the most persuasive reasons for maintaining the marriage of convenience with Saudi Arabia disappeared. With the September 11 attacks, the returns on this partnership went from zero to negative. The Saudis have become the friends of our enemies and the enemies of our friends. Bin Laden is an extension of Saudi foreign policy. To be fair, the Saudis do not quite know how to deal with the monster they have created - so far they have avoided tough choices. As long as the benefits of sponsoring terror are enormous and the costs of sponsoring terror are negligible, they will not take decisive action.

Quote to Ponder "Most people would rather die than think;  in fact, they do so."                                   - Bertrand Russell Timeless Truism "Can a government which robs Peter to pay Paul always depend on the support of Paul?"                                - George Bernard Shaw  Austin Chapter Website Do not forget to visit the chapter website (http://www.main.org/mowwaustin). If you have items to put on the website contact LTC Howard (255-2206). Newsletter For submissions to the Companion Bulletin, contact the editor, Charles Szendrey Staff Meeting The next staff meeting will be at the call of the Commander.